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Owen Darbishire* 
Switching Systems: Technological Change, Competition, and 
Privatisation** 
 
New technology and expanding service capabilities are leading both to substantial 
competition in the telecommunications industry, and also to the demise of public ownership. 
The case of Deutsche Telekom illustrates that although public sector status failed to provide 
sufficient strategic or organisational flexibility in a dynamic market this was less due to the 
public sector institutions of industrial relations themselves, than to the interaction of 
institutions with political decisions, which reduced Telekom’s ability to restructure itself in 
an increasingly competitive environment. Nevertheless, the privatisation of Telekom also 
highlights the central co-ordinating role of the public sector’s hierarchical Personalräte 
works council structure. The strategic challenges for unions inherent in the decentralised 
private sector works council system illuminate the importance of unions providing inter-
works council co-ordination, in addition to the usually emphasised co-ordination between 
union and works council—an ability central to unions retaining their influence under 
conditions of increasing decentralisation. 
 
Neue Technologien und erweiterte Leistungsangebote führen zu beträchtlichem 
Wettbewerb in der Telekommunikationsbranche und zu einem Rückgang der öffentlichen 
Beteiligung an den Telekommunikationsunternehmen. Der Fall der Deutschen Telekom 
veranschaulicht, daß der öffentliche Status keine in einem dynamischen Markt ausreichende 
strategische oder organisatorische Flexibilität zuließ, daß dies aber weniger den Institutio-
nen der Arbeitsbeziehungen im öffentlichen Sektor per se angelastet werden kann, sondern 
auf ein Zusammenspiel von Institutionen und politischen Entscheidungen zurückgeführt 
werden muß – ein Zusammenspiel, das die Fähigkeit der Telekom einschränkte, sich in 
einer Umwelt zunehmenden Wettbewerbs zu restrukturieren. Die Telekom-Privatisierung 
erhellt darüber hinaus die bedeutende Koordinationsfunktion, die den Personalräten als 
den hierarchisch organisierten Personalvertretungen im öffentlichen Sektor zukommt. 
Umgekehrt weisen die strategischen Probleme, die sich für die Gewerkschaften aus dem 
dezentralisierten Personalvertretungssystem durch Betriebsräte im Privatsektor ergeben, 
auf die Bedeutung einer besonderen Form der Koordination: Über die häufig betonte 
Koordination zwischen Gewerkschaft und Betriebsrat hinaus müssen Gewerkschaften eine 
Koordination zwischen den Betriebsräten selbst herstellen, wenn sie ihren Einfluß unter den 
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1. Introduction 
The conjunction of technological change, globalisation, demands for flexible 
and customised production, and increasing competitive pressures have fundamentally 
affected service industries as well as manufacturing. As the dominant service industry 
(and, indeed, fast becoming the dominant industry) telecommunications is both a 
fundamental recipient and conduit of this change. Digital switching equipment, and 
the convergence of the telecommunications and computer industries, is vastly 
increasing the range of products that can be offered to both businesses and 
individuals—a move from ‘POTS’ (Plain Old Telephone Services) to ‘PANS’ (Pretty 
Amazing New Services). In turn, this has substantially promoted the globalisation of 
the industry, itself reflected in the expansion of international joint ventures between 
telecommunications companies. Furthermore, these changes have created widespread 
pressures for the liberalisation and privatisation of previously government owned 
monopoly telephone companies (Hills 1986, 1991). 
In Germany, however, the move towards both liberalisation and privatisation has 
been slow, reflecting the institutional context of political decision making (Webber, 
1992). A 1989 reform (‘Post Reform I’) created three largely independent companies 
(Telekom, Post, and Bank) from the previously monolithic Deutsche Bundespost 
(DBP), separated the regulatory and entrepreneurial activities of the DBP, and 
introduced some marginal competition. As Webber (1992) argues, the impulse for 
this reform came from new technology and international pressure, such that 
“technological and market change may be seen as political ‘ice-breakers’ ” (p.175). In 
spite of the limited nature of these initial reforms, the pace of change has quickened, 
and on 8 July, 1994 the Bundesrat completed the long political process to change the 
Basic Law, and thereby transfer the three Deutsche Bundespost companies (Telekom, 
Post, and Bank) into private joint stock status (Aktiengesellschaft) from 1 January, 
1995.1  
This transformation to an Aktiengesellschaft (AG) will significantly impact on 
the framework and practice of industrial relations in all three DBP companies. The 
changes will include: An important decline in the hitherto high level of ‘political 
contingency’ (Batstone et al., 1984) that characterised company strategic, operational, 
and industrial relations decisions; radical changes in the works council structure, 
strategy, and daily operating procedures; a new bargaining structure and process; and 
it will necessitate substantial changes to the strategy, organisation, and role of the 
Deutsche Postgewerkschaft (DPG), the union representing workers throughout the 
DBP. These changes, which are being driven by new institutional structures, are 
                                                          
1  This transfer does not amount to an actual privatisation of the DBP, but rather a transfer to 
private sector status. The first tranche of shares in Telekom is due to be sold in 1996, while 
the government will retain a majority shareholding until 1999 in Telekom, and at least 2000 
in Post. Nevertheless, for ease, the term privatisation is used to refer to the change to private 
sector status. 
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compounded by organisational, strategic, operational, and technological changes 
already initiated within DBP Telekom and Post. 
The challenges facing the employees’ representatives in this process are 
substantial, even though the political process of privatisation has created an 
institutional structure of representation that is, even in Germany, uniquely strong. 
These challenges require appropriate strategic responses from the union and works 
council if the German ‘dual structure’ is to secure both flexibility and employee 
protection. The strategic responses include the need for rebalancing the respective 
roles played by the union and the works councils. However, this analysis contrasts 
with previous analyses of the ‘dual system’ based on research in manufacturing, or in 
the metal working sector more specifically, and the automobile industry in particular 
(see, inter alia, Thelen, 1991; Turner, 1991; Streeck, 1984a, 1984b; Katz, 1993). 
Rather than the shift in roles being essentially a decentralisation of capabilities to 
works councils, it is the union that will be required to develop a new co-ordinating 
function between works councils within the same company. 
Through an examination of the public ownership of Deutsche Telekom, and the 
process and rationale for its privatisation, two principal arguments will be made: 
First, public sector status proved an insufficiently flexible structure to address the 
needs of a firm facing substantial technological change, and an increasingly customer 
orientated environment. However, this conclusion is based most notably on the 
influence of political decision making, rather than on the structure of public sector 
industrial relations institutions per se. These institutions, including the Beamte (civil 
service) status of half Telekom’s workers, the hierarchical Personalräte (public 
sector works council) structure, and the collective bargaining institutions, have not 
themselves been shown to be a significant hindrance to Telekom. Nevertheless, where 
public sector institutions have interacted with political strategic choices they have 
inhibited the development of a customer focus to Telekom, and have slowed internal 
reforms. 
Secondly, it is argued that the public sector works council structure 
(Personalräte) has important strategic advantages for unions over the private sector 
one (Betriebsräte). In particular, the centralised, hierarchical, framework of the 
Personalräte significantly aids the ability of workers to ensure interaction with 
strategic decision makers, while simultaneously co-ordinating conditions across 
works councils. The (multiple) decentralised, non-hierarchical, Betriebsräte in 
different establishments within a single company face the significant danger of the 
absence of a co-ordinating mechanism between themselves, requiring an additional 
role for the union, even given the presence of a central works council 
(Gesamtbetriebsrat). This problem is most likely to exist in large service industry 
companies where production units are typically both smaller and locationally more 
diverse than in manufacturing. Additionally, the decentralised Betriebsräte in this 
environment are not assured of interacting with strategic decision makers within the 
firm. This means that in multi-plant firms they are best suited to cases where 
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management decision making is also decentralised to the plant level, or where they 
successfully co-ordinate their interaction at the strategic level. 
The analysis will proceed in four stages: First, the pre-privatisation status of 
Telekom, and the 1989 Post Reform I, are outlined. Second, the constraints of the 
public sector are examined in two respects—through the impact on organisational 
structure, strategy, and thus work organisation, and also through bargaining. Third, 
the privatisation of Telekom is sketched. Fourth, the comparative role of works 
councils in the public and private sectors is examined, addressing the strategic role 
the underlying difference requires the union to play. The conclusion assesses the 
implications for other German companies, and argues that in the “dual system” it is 
not just the inter union and works council link that is important, but rather also the 
union intra works councils links. 
2. Political Status: Before and After Post Reform I 
Prior to the privatisation of the Deutsche Bundespost, its existence was based on 
Article 87 of the Basic Law, which determined that the DBP had to be operated as a 
federal administration, subject to exclusive federal legislation (with the need for the 
consent of the Bundesrat), with the federal Minister for Posts and Tele-
communications having autonomous responsibility in the conduct of DBP affairs. 
Furthermore, operation of the DBP had to be in accordance with the general 
economic, financial, and social policy of the government, while separate legislation 
governed the operational practice of the DBP (Schmidt, 1991, 1993; Dörrenbächer, 
1988; Büchner, 1993).2  
Prior to Post Reform I in 1989, the DBP was itself also a part of the federal 
Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications, was a monolithic entity (encompassing 
the three functions of telecommunications, postal, and banking services), and there 
was no separation of regulatory or operational decision making. The DBP was thus 
directly and immediately subordinate to the federal minister, resulting in a 
fundamental political basis to decision making. Besides the role of the Ministry of 
Posts and Telecommunications, the ministers of Finance, the Interior, Economics, and 
Labour all had competence in their respective jurisdictions. Furthermore, in 
formulating policy for certain management decisions, the Minister of Posts was 
required to seek the consent of the Postverwaltungsrat (Postal Administration 
Council), a body comprising 5 members from each of the Bundestag, Bundesrat, and 
industry, 7 from the unions, and 2 telecommunications and financial experts 
(Dörrenbächer, 1988; Schmidt, 1991). 
In strategic, operational, and organisational policy formulation, therefore, all 
stakeholders were well represented, even apart from more indirect political influence 
of both the workers’ representatives and the industry (including, in particular, such 
equipment suppliers as Siemans, IBM, and Nixdorf). This had substantial effects on 
                                                          
2  These additional laws included the Postverwaltungsgesetz (Postal Administration Act) and 
the Fernmeldeanlagengesetz (Telecommunications Installation Act). 
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the choice of new switching equipment and prices paid for this, the tariff structure, 
development of new services, and the role of the unions. Furthermore, Schmidt 
(1991) notes that the influence of multiple ministries hampered organisational 
flexibility (p.216). Indeed, attempts at reform in the late 1970s, which had focused on 
the organisational structure of the DBP rather than liberalisation, failed. 
Following the report of the Witte Commission in 1987, a process of reform of 
the DBP was initiated. This culminated in ‘Post Reform I’ which restructured the 
DBP on 1 July, 1989. The principal effects of Post Reform I were that regulatory and 
political functions were removed from entrepreneurial ones; the three enterprises 
were given independent entrepreneurial functions to be run by management boards; 
prices were to be increasingly based on costs, with more focus on profits; and there 
was to be greater flexibility in personnel policy. Furthermore, the telecommunications 
market was reformed, with some additional competition, though Deutsche Telekom 
retained monopoly of both the core network and voice services (90% of their revenue 
source). 
The debate surrounding the reform focused on a dichotomy of views of the 
appropriate role of the DBP, and its constituent parts (especially tele-
communications). On the one hand was the view that the DBP should be a federal 
administration, governed by Article 87 of the Basic Law, “which effectively stands 
against a primarily profit-orientated supply” (Schmidt, 1993, p.4), and was rather 
based on the basic infrastructural obligations of the DBP for all consumers. On the 
other hand digital technology was providing the opportunity for a substantial range of 
new services to business customers in particular, but such a change required a new 
structure for the industry. Behind these arguments, the DPG union had launched a 
campaign against liberalisation in October 1986, not least because of their fear that it 
could lead to a weakening of their institutionally strong position, an erosion of the 
beneficial social conditions that they had negotiated as a public administration, a 
lessening of job protection and training opportunities, and the divergence of 
conditions among the three constituent parts of the DBP. With the support of the 
SPD, equipment suppliers, and federal states they were able to limit the extent of 
reform. Additionally, they were able to secure the establishment of a “Council for 
Infrastructural Matters” that included involvement for federal states, and an “Office 
for Welfare” that was designed to prevent the divergence of workers’ rights and 
conditions in the three enterprises (Schmidt, 1991). 
 
 
3. The Public Sector as a Hindrance? 
The compromise nature of Post Reform I meant that in spite of the increased 
entrepreneurial independence within Telekom, direct political control, and indirect 
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political influence, continued to play an important role in a multiplicity of operational 
areas. In turn, these have had significant implications for the organisation of work, 
personnel policy decisions, bargaining and industrial relations, and the speed to 
which Telekom has focused on customers and adopted new services. 
3.1 Work Organisation and Operational Structures 
Before Post Reform I, while part of the Ministry of Posts and 
Telecommunications, senior management of the three DBP companies were 
organisationally integrated, leading to a focus on basic, technological, infrastructural 
goals, rather than diversified customer requirements. Furthermore, even within the 
telecommunications section, the functional organisation reflected historical evolution, 
and political positioning. In an example of (in terms of organisational theory) the old 
structure defining the new, Post Reform I maintained this political organisation—for 
example, with the separation of switching and telephone services on the one hand, 
and transmission operations on the other. While this suited a technological orientation 
in an analogue environment, the (politically determined) failure to reform this 
structure until 1992 inhibited the effective planning of the digital network (since 
operational requirements suggested the integration of switching and transmission in 
order to gain economies of scope, and to plan effectively the digitalisation of the 
network, given that returns to the technology are considerably enhanced when 
technological updates occur in both operational areas). 
Digitalisation, which was the spur to the need to reorganise the network, was 
consequently slowed, and has substantially lagged other international carriers. In 
spite of beginning the digitalisation programme in 1985 emphasis was given (up until 
1992 especially) to optimising the use of existing analogue technology, and by 1994 
only 30% of the network was digital. However, this reflects more than a politically 
determined organisational structure. As a monopoly Telekom has lacked both the 
market and the political spurs to orientate its technological strategy around a 
customer focus, or to maximise the customer service potential of new technology. 
Politically, this significantly reflects the emphasis of both the Ministry of Post and 
Telecommunications, and the Basic Law, on simple infrastructural goals and a 
technological orientation. Furthermore, and importantly, existing stakeholders have 
lacked the incentive to use their strong (institutionalised) influence to change this 
situation. This is particularly so given that the new technology in telecommunications 
implies a fundamental shift in the focus and philosophy of the company, which 
(together with implied rationalisations) challenges their position. Existing 
stakeholders have, therefore, largely promoted the status quo. 
The impact has been on the adoption of new technology and the degree of 
modernisation of the network, customer orientation, and the cost and breadth of 
services offered (Gerpott and Pospischil, 1993; DTI, 1994). These operational and 
organisational effects have had important implications for work organisation and 
industrial relations. Work has hitherto been specialised around technological types, 
with the emphasis on analogue equipment, and a correspondingly slow development 
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of digital skills. This functional organisation of operations has been in contrast to a 
strategy of de-emphasising technology in favour of a customer focus, with a 
corresponding increase in sales, marketing, and business management skills. Indeed, 
Telekom recognises that it is particularly lacking in these skills, as a direct result of 
having focused on the infrastructure and not customers.3  
As market pressures (and European Union decisions) have continued to reduce 
the force of the political contingency, major reorganisations of corporate strategy and 
work organisation have resulted. Telekom Service 2000 (TS2000) involves a 
rationalisation and reorganisation of work, including a concentration of technological 
operations, specialisation of work by customer type rather than technological type, 
and some associated multi-skilling in both the Business and Private Customer 
divisions. Telekom Kontakt involves a reorganisation of company structure, with a 
divisionalisation of Telekom into Networks, Business Customers, and Private 
(Residential) Customers (Darbishire, 1995). Nevertheless, although these changes in 
work organisation are now on-going, they also lag behind change in other 
telecommunications companies. Indeed, the lack of a customer focus is illustrated by 
the fact that while the quality of the basic network has frequently been high, basic 
computer systems to enhance customer service have been absent. Thus, not only have 
such services as account billing breakdowns been unobtainable, but until the end of 
1993 all customer details (for both business and residential customers) were on index 
cards. This both reflects, and in turn substantially affects, the organisation and 
process of work within Telekom. During 1994-1996 customer focused computer 
systems are planned to be expanded and integrated to enable the provision of higher 
levels of service. Furthermore, it is as these systems are introduced that new work 
processes and work organisation will be introduced.  
The current organisational reform (and divisionalisation) of Telekom entailed in 
Telekom Kontakt, which both reflects and is designed to facilitate Telekom’s new 
strategy, would also not have been feasible prior to Post Reform I in 1989. At that 
stage, the management of the Deutsche Bundespost ‘companies’ shared many 
facilities and services at both the “Generaldirektion” and “Direktion” levels.4 
Managing a divisional structure would, at the very minimum, have been highly 
complex. Indeed, Telekom has argued that the requirement (prior to privatisation) to 
maintain a three tier structure, with minimum levels of functions at all levels, has also 
hindered the decentralisation process contained within the Telekom Kontakt 
programme.5 
                                                          
3  Nevertheless, new training programmes developed between 1992-1994, such as 
Kaufmann/Kauffrau für Bürokommunikation, are intended to help rectify this weakness. 
4  Public sector companies in Germany are required to be organised on a three tier structure. In 
Telekom, these have been the Generaldirektion, Direktion, and Ämter (renamed in the 
Telekom Kontakt reorganisation Niederlassungen). 
5  It is not, however, possible to examine this claim, since the process of decentralisation and 
divisionalisation within the Telekom Kontakt programme is not yet sufficiently advanced. 
International evidence suggests, however, that it could be managed. 
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The role of the Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications has also significantly 
increased the centralisation of management, caused a high degree of centralised 
regulation, and slowed changes in work organisation. To a substantial degree this has 
reflected political control over decision making, not least because of the implications 
of Telekom’s investment decisions (with investments of DM 25.5 billion in 1993, 
Telekom’s investments represented the equivalent of 25% of all manufacturing and 
process industry investment in Germany, including mining), employment, tariff 
levels, and revenue decisions—between 1990-1993 Telekom contributed an average 
DM 6.9 billion per annum to the government in levies, taxes, or financial 
compensation to other DBP companies.  
This political contingency is further reflected in the timing and scale of 
investments in eastern Germany—a planned total of DM 60 billion by 1997—and the 
choice of private sector contractors (through “Turn-Key” projects) to complete much 
of this work.6 When combined with the political emphasis on speed and not costs, the 
use of contractors has also had a detrimental effect on quality, while much of the 
investment would not have been financially or economically feasible for a private 
sector company—itself reflecting Telekom’s direct fulfilment of its constitutional 
infrastructural obligation. 
Political and bureaucratic control was also reflected in the evolution of the 
TS2000 rationalisation of work organisation. The first programmes of change date 
from 1983-1985, though then the underlying philosophy was different, reflecting the 
different organisational structure to the company, and in particular an absence of a 
customer focus. Instead, the reorganisation was to be functional. Yet even in this 
framework change was very slow, and although widely viewed as effective, the 
current reorganisation is highly centralised and bureaucratic, encompassing 800-900 
pages of regulations, including the single digit specification of employment levels 
required in field offices.7 
A further important strategy adopted by Telekom to circumvent perceived 
inflexibility, such as in the public sector organisational structure, wage systems and 
incentive pay, and Beamte (civil service) rules, has been the foundation of subsidiary 
companies, which similarly has important industrial relations implications 
(Darbishire, 1995). The extent of the direct influence of politicians within Telekom 
has, however, been most direct in the areas of bargaining and human resource 
management. 
3.2  Politics and Bargaining 
                                                          
6  This preference of the CDU/CSU/FDP coalition government did, however, also fit with 
Telekom’s objectives, since in the push for privatisation it was anxious to show that the 
private sector could play an important role in a rapid infrastructural development. 
7  It should be noted that both the Telekom Kontakt reorganisation, and a KQM (Kunden 
Qualität Management) programme, are seeking to move Telekom away from this bureaucratic 
model, both entailing a decentralisation of operational capabilities (Darbishire, 1995). 
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Two factors underlie the direct political control of bargaining: First, the legal 
status of Beamte results in their employment security on the one hand, but an absence 
of rights to collective bargaining or industrial action on the other. Rather, their 
employment conditions and wages are determined by parliament (in the Federal 
Remuneration Act),8 and not by Telekom management. Secondly, although Post 
Reform I established Telekom as a ‘company’ with the authority to conclude 
collective bargaining agreements with the unions for Arbeiter (workers), and 
Angestellte (white collar workers), this was sharply limited by its continuing structure 
as a public administration. 
Prior to 1989 responsibility for collective bargaining rested with the federal 
Minister for Posts and Telecommunications, though in practice bargaining was 
carried out by the Minister of the Interior, along with the entire public sector (in the 
Tarifgemeinschaft öffentlicher Dienst). Post Reform I delegated to the Management 
Boards of each DBP company the right to conclude independent collective 
agreements with the Deutsche Postgewerkschaft (though they are entitled to form a 
single DBP bargaining unit, or Tarifgemeinschaft). This right was, however, also 
limited by the Deutsche Bundespost Constitution Act, which delegated bargaining 
competence to the Minister of Posts and Telecommunications and the Minister of the 
Interior for any issue of “fundamental importance” to the rest of the public sector. 
This has been deemed to account for nearly all matters contained within either a wage 
agreement (Lohntarifvertrag) or agreement on working conditions 
(Manteltarifvertrag). Thus, Telekom’s negotiations have been carried out not only 
within the context of the DBP, but of the whole public sector. Owing to its size, ÖTV 
leads these negotiations for the unions, with the Minister of the Interior being the 
government’s counterpart. 9 (Formally the DBP negotiations are parallel to those of 
ÖTV, though the extension is almost complete.) 
This bargaining structure substantially limited Telekom’s (and the DPG’s) 
freedom to pursue their own agendas, severely restricting the range of agreements 
that could be reached. Although this centralised bargaining structure is somewhat 
akin to sectoral bargaining in the private sector, important differences exist. First, the 
centralisation of bargaining in the public sector did not take wages out of competition 
for Telekom, since the administrative employment structure in the majority of the 
public sector does not reflect the more technically skilled work organisation in 
Telekom. The importance of this factor has, however, been muted by Telekom’s 
monopoly status in most operational areas. Nevertheless, as liberalisation of segments 
of the market, and technological change, make the nature of the skills and workforce 
requirements in Telekom increasingly like those of the private sector, Telekom has 
found itself in increased competition for technical skills. 
                                                          
8  Bundesbesoldungsgesetz. 
9  In 1992 ÖTV (Gewerkschaft öffentliche Dienste, Transport und Verkehr) had a membership 
of 2.1m, compared with 611,244 for the DPG (Source: DGB Vorstand). 
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Related to this, Telekom has not had the opportunity to conduct (informal) 
supplementary negotiations with the works council at the enterprise level, and thus to 
have a degree of wage drift common amongst large private sector companies. 
Telekom has thus feared being “held back” if bargaining was to remain tied to quite 
different sets of technological and personnel conditions within the rest of the public 
sector. Indeed, these conditions are also quite different within the DBP, as witnessed 
by Post’s personnel costs amounting to 76% of its cost structure in 1993, and 
Telekom’s 33%. 
Nevertheless, both prior to Post Reform I, and subsequently, some bargaining 
flexibility has existed. First, where employment conditions within Telekom are 
particular to itself (such as with technical specialists) specific rules have applied, and 
Telekom’s job grading structure thus exhibits small differences both to Post, and to 
other parts of the public sector. Secondly, the consequences of rationalisation 
measures have been negotiated within contracts specific to Telekom, such as with the 
1994 Telekom Service 2000 Tarifvertrag. Third, the DPG has been successful in 
extending some working conditions it has negotiated with Telekom (or the BMPT 
prior to 1989) to Beamte, creating a pseudo-bargain for Beamte. This is achieved 
through Telekom agreeing to apply the agreement to all workers, with the TS2000 
contract again a recent example. Fourth, some flexibility to negotiate conditions 
within the DBP as a whole has, historically, been possible. However, the different 
employment and financial conditions of the DBP companies has again constrained 
both the DPG and Telekom. This is illustrated by the DPG’s inability to extend equal 
rights of full-time employees to part-timers, owing to the opposition not of Telekom, 
but of Post (which has a high proportion of part-timers, and is constrained by being a 
loss making enterprise). 
The realisation that Telekom was increasingly operating in a more market 
orientated environment led to the inclusion of two unique components within Post 
Reform I. The first involved an increase in the flexibility of the Beamte grading and 
promotion structure (Postlaufbahnverordnung), easing the rules determining ratios of 
specific hierarchical classifications, thereby allowing Telekom to compete more 
flexibly in the labour market for technical skills. (The desire to reduce employment 
levels has, however, meant that it has also begun to be used as a motivational tool for 
decentralised management.) Post Reform I also established the Postleistungszulagen, 
an individually based performance related pay system, restricted to the DBP, and 
which initially applied to Beamte only (though in 1992 bargaining it was extended to 
all workers). The objective was to increase the motivation of employees (Beamte) 
who enjoyed fundamental employment security in an increasingly customer 
orientated sector. It comprises a decentralised system, whereby up to 25% of workers 
(and 40% of a given grade) can be paid a bonus based on their (largely subjectively 
determined) performance level. This bonus is individually (not team) based, and 
amounts to between DM 60-230 per month for A3 classification workers, and DM 
280-1230 per month for B3 workers. Telekom also has individualised contracts for 
top managers, though the number amounts to fewer than 50, and Telekom laments its 
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inability to use incentive pay systems for a wide range of senior management, to 
coincide with their increasing moves to Management By Objectives.10 This is due to 
be an early change post-privatisation. 
Generally, however, the existence of Beamte, who amount to 52% of Telekom’s 
staff, has not been a restriction on internal mobility, while first and second line 
managers report no difference in productivity levels with Arbeiter and Angestellte. 
Indeed, Beamte are an extreme example of trading off external (or numeric) 
flexibility for internal (or functional) flexibility. Their legally determined 
employment security is counterbalanced by a legally determined job and locational 
flexibility. In practice, however, restrictions on the flexibility of Beamte have come 
through the extension of protections negotiated for Arbeiter and Angestellte to 
Beamte (as with the TS2000 contract).11  
The greatest restriction on personnel policy has, however, concerned 
employment levels, which Telekom has been prevented from adjusting other than by 
employee turnover. Technological change, and digitalisation and fibre optic lines in 
particular, are substantially reducing employment needs in core telephone services. 
Other telecoms companies have been substantially reducing employment use—BT’s 
falling, for example, from 235,000 in 1984 to 150,000 in 1994 (the reduction being 
predominantly post-1990, and with a target level of 100,000), AT&T’s fell from 
373,000 to 253,800 between 1984-1990, and an average fall of 28% has occurred 
among the US RBOCs’ regulated telephone service (Keefe and Batt, 1994). During 
the same period, however, Telekom’s employment has risen from 207,000 to 
231,000. This rise is partly attributable to unification, while the reductions at BT and 
AT&T also reflect both the timing of technological change, and strategic choices 
made within the companies. Nevertheless, Telekom has been fundamentally 
constrained by its public sector status, a problem to be compounded over the next few 
years as the pace of planned technological changes and rationalisations increasingly 
reduce core employment requirements. Current goals of the elimination of 30,000 
jobs by 1998 are widely expected within Telekom to be only half the real number. 
The constraints are not, however, simply the result of the employment security of the 
52% of employees who are Beamte, or those Arbeiter and Angestellte who have 15 
years of service and are over 40 years old.12 Rather, Telekom was prevented from 
even offering early retirement or financially lucrative voluntary release programmes, 
in spite of this having been actively (though privately) pushed with ministers. Indeed, 
                                                          
10  The Postleistungszulagen is restricted in form, and cannot be used as a wide ranging incentive 
scheme, or be related to achievements of set objectives—this being largely related to its 
competitive structure. 
11  While motivation has not yet been an issue, it still remains possible that the employment 
guarantee Beamte enjoy will create problems if Telekom tries to speed up work in the face of 
competition—hence their desire for performance related pay. This has not yet proved a 
problem, though it may require careful management by Telekom in the future. 
12  Telekom has, in fact, a relatively young age profile, with 64% of employees being 40 or 
under. 
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the significance of this constraint is illustrated by Telekom’s rapid post-privatisation 
announcement in February 1995 that it intends to increase its employment reduction 
programme from 30,000 by 1998, to 60,000 by 2000. 
The political objections to employment reduction while Telekom was in the 
public sector were threefold. First, the weak labour market; second, public resentment 
against Beamte, deriving substantially from their employment security; and third, the 
budgetary position of the federal and Länder governments, which has led to strong 
pressure to increase the hours of Beamte, and restrain their wages, rather than reduce 
their working years. These constraints, and their prospective impact as digitalisation 
increases, were a principal (though understated) reason why Telekom pushed for 
privatisation. The privatisation Act does not change the employment security of 
workers (whether Beamte, Arbeiter, or Angestellte), though it does give Telekom the 
right to offer early retirement to Beamte at the age of either 55 or 60, depending on 
career level, and raises the opportunity to develop alternative voluntary programmes. 
Basic contractual restrictions do still apply, however, and this is forcing Telekom to 
have to seek alternative employment strategies wherever possible (such as joint 
ventures with Compaq, Cannon, Preussag, IBM, and Fabis, with additional proposed 
joint ventures with Kirch and Bertelsmann aiming to utilise Telekom’s ownership of 
the world’s largest cable television network). The strategic choices that are being 
forced on Telekom (by the employment rights of employees and the strength of the 
union) are thus quite different from those adopted in BT and AT&T, though greater 
political freedom facilitates a wider range of strategic choices within an anyway 
constrained environment (Darbishire, 1995). 
4. Flexibility or Institutional Security? Privatising Telekom 
Both Post Reform I and Post Reform II, the privatisation of Telekom, were 
strongly opposed by the DPG and other unions represented by the DGB union 
confederation. Whilst opposing privatisation itself, the DPG also accepted the need to 
increase the independence of operation of the Deutsche Bundespost in general, and 
Telekom in particular. The DPG’s preferred option, which it strongly pushed the SPD 
to agree as the only acceptable option, was to create the DBP as an “Anstalt des 
öffentlichen Rechts” — a statutory body under public law. The DPG’s predominant 
concerns during the privatisation process were: 
- deteriorating employment conditions in the private sector; 
- a loss of employment security; 
- the place of Beamte in a private sector company; 
- a threat to the institutional position, strength, and influence of the DPG itself; 
- a separation of the links between the three DBP companies, and consequent 
variations in conditions between them; 
- a reduction of emphasis on infrastructural development; 
- a rebalancing of tariffs to the detriment of residential customers; and 
- the growth of differential levels of service by customer type. 
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Telekom, which was the principal force behind privatisation within the DBP, 
and which was also the centre of the attention of the CDU/CSU/FDP coalition, had 
four principal objectives: 
- freedom from political control and bureaucracy; 
- an easing of financial constraints;13 
- the ability to conduct international joint ventures;14 and 
- freedom in the fields of personnel and industrial relations. 
With respect to the last objective, Telekom wanted both greater employment and 
bargaining flexibility, and changes to the internal structures within Telekom. These 
included easing grading and promotional rules, training structures, more performance 
related pay, eliminating the three tier organisational structure, and breaking the 
institutional links with the other DBP companies. Telekom also wanted to reduce cost 
structures, which meant not being bound by existing contractual agreements, which 
they view as too generous and expensive. 
After two years (which included extensive strife and negotiations, 30 days of 
industrial action and strikes involving 100,000 DBP workers immediately preceding 
the privatisation vote, and both political and industrial compromise) the two-thirds 
majority to privatise the DBP was agreed in July 1994. This compromise establishes 
the structure of Telekom, including the institutional representation of employees.  
Although Telekom (like Post and Bank) has been ‘privatised’ separately, a 
Holding Company has been established, both to control the government’s shares prior 
to their sale, but importantly also to be a party to future Manteltarifverträge 
(agreements on working conditions). This fits with the DPG’s objective of 
maintaining equality of conditions between the DBP companies. The Holding is, 
however, considerably weaker in this respect than they had pushed for, though on the 
other hand, it does reduce the flexibility of each company in bargaining. A further 
important accomplishment with respect to bargaining was that the DPG has secured 
its right as the responsible bargaining party for the DBP companies, and also for all 
subsidiaries, which are in turn bound to negotiate with the DPG. This reflects the 
union emphasis on its institutional existence, rather than centralisation, being related 
to the unusual position of the DPG as a company-based union, rather than a sectoral 
one—a “more obvious” alignment being IG Metall (or IG Medien) representation in 
                                                          
13  This included reducing payments to the government, politically determined investment levels, 
subsidies within the DBP, and the freedom to raise more capital (in particular for international 
joint ventures) outside of tight government budgets and a very low ratio of capital and 
reserves as a proportion of total assets (of 22% in 1993). 
14  Telekom was restricted by the constitution from entering into joint ventures, and especially 
those not connected with basic infrastructural development. Some of its joint ventures fitted 
this latter category, for example, that with Ameritech to form the Magyar Com Group in 
Hungry, while others, such as the formation of Eunetcom with France Télécom, involved a 
narrower range of services because of restrictions. The agreement to purchase 20% of Sprint 
along with France Télécom in June 1994 would have been of questionable legality had 
privatisation not occured. 
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Telekom, HBV for Bank, and ÖTV for Post. It thus also reflects the concern caused 
by the loss of IG Metall representation rights in IBM to DAG following that 
company’s divisionalisation—a strategy that Telekom had privately considered for its 
subsidiaries. (Furthermore, an external agreement reached in June 1994 between IG 
Metall and the DPG will lead to co-operation in seeking representation in new 
telecoms companies in Germany.) 
Employee representation rights in the Supervisory Board are also uniquely 
strong, with equal worker and owner representation. Given the dominance of the 
DPG, it will hold almost all of the employees’ seats. Beyond this, a staff committee 
was legislated, with a workers’ representative as chairman, which has responsibility 
for personnel matters of the Management Board. The change from the 
Personalvertretungsrecht to the Betriebsverfassungsgesetz as the law establishing 
works councils that accompanies privatisation would have led to an almost halving of 
the numbers of employee representatives released from work duties. This has been 
adjusted for, at least until June 1997. 
Further important achievements for the DPG were that they secured the 
continuation of all contractual conditions after privatisation, the maintenance of 
‘social institutions and services’ run by the DBP, the extension of contract conditions 
(including employment security at the age of 40 with 15 years service) to east 
Germany, the equalisation of wages in the east and west at the latest in conjunction 
with the public sector, and the application of equal conditions for all new workers—
i.e. no duality in contractual arrangements for old and new employees, as has 
occurred in the Bundesbahn. These significant achievements reflect the pressure the 
DPG and DGB imposed on the SPD, together with the need for a two-thirds majority 
to change the constitution, and the DPG strike which would otherwise have delayed 
the privatisation decision.  
On the other hand, the DPG was not only unsuccessful in preventing 
privatisation, but it also neither gained collective bargaining rights for Beamte (which 
has been a long-time goal, though one of increased importance as the balance of 
power is shifting from political to industrial muscle), nor established as strong a 
Holding Company as it wanted. Thus, Beamte will remain in Telekom (though in a 
new “Beleihungsmodell”—Sattler and Schwemmle, 1994), and their conditions will 
continue to be established by the government without any direct bargaining. 
Furthermore, the change from the public to private sector works council structures 
will challenge the DPG’s ability to co-ordinate between these works councils. 
5. Diverging Employee Representation Systems 
The employee representation system in the public sector is based on the reverse 
principle to that in the private sector: In contrast to the essentially decentralised 
structure of private sector works councils (Betriebsräte), those in the public sector 
(Personalräte) are based on a hierarchically organised three tier structure, with 
authority based foremost in the Hauptpersonalrat, and flowing down the hierarchy to 
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the Bezirkspersonalräte, and the local Örtliche Personalräte. In the private sector, 
works councils are based on a non-hierarchical two-tier structure. It is works councils 
at the workplace level which are vested with initial authority, while the 
Gesamtbetriebsrat (or company works council) receives authority from the 
workplace works councils, and has competence for company wide policies, those that 
affect several establishments and which the individual works councils are unable to 
settle within their establishments, or for what is delegated to it, in writing and by a 
majority vote. That is, the fundamental flow of authority is upwards, rather than 
downwards as in the public sector. Indeed, this is the single most important 
distinction between the two structures, since their codetermination, information, and 
consultation rights are in essence alike. 
5.1  Hierarchical Works Councils 
The three tier structure of the Personalräte structure is designed to correspond to 
the traditional three tier structure of the government, i.e. federal, state, and 
community levels, and the correspondence intentionally results in the interaction of 
employee representatives with appropriate decision makers, whether they be at the 
strategic, tactical, or operational levels. As a public administration, Telekom also had 
to maintain this structure. For the employees, this meant the presence of 123 works 
councils at the local office level (Ämter), 23 at the intermediate (Direktion) level, and 
the Hauptpersonalrat. 
The Personalräte structure helped to reinforce the centralisation within 
Telekom, and to encourage decision making within the Generaldirektion (the 
“Fortress on the Rhine”), and the Hauptpersonalrat. The DPG has had a consistent 
policy of maintaining a uniform level of conditions throughout the Deutsche 
Bundespost, and thus also to avoid any variation within Telekom. The 
Hauptpersonalrat shared these goals, while also being organised such that it has an 
automatic interaction with the DPG Vorstand (union executive board) following all 
proposals presented to it by Telekom. Indeed, these meetings with the DPG follow 
the monthly meetings with Telekom’s Management Board. Should there be any 
policy differences between the DPG and the Hauptpersonalrat, these are settled 
though a majority ballot, prior to any response being given to the Telekom 
Management Board.  
Decision making is thus tightly controlled at this level, and agreements 
(Dienstvereinbarungen) between the Hauptpersonalrat and Telekom’s Management 
Board contain considerable detail, and are highly centralised in operation. The three 
most important recent examples are the agreements on the DELKOS decentralised 
cost control systems, the DASPO personnel data and management system, and 
working time flexibility. Rather than delegate all competence on this last issue to the 
office level, for example, the Hauptpersonalrat adopted a strategy of specifying the 
core working time (of 9am to 3pm), allowing local flexibility of 2 hours earlier, and 
1½ later. 
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Such centralised control prevented any potential whipsawing or pressure 
management in an environment of substantial rationalisations. (In fact, the nature of 
investment decisions in the telecommunications industry makes whipsawing less 
likely than in manufacturing. Nevertheless, “precedent setting” and local managerial 
pressure can have the same effect.) Centralisation has also considerably reduced the 
degree of co-ordination required between the multiplicity of Örtliche Personalräte, 
though the input of lower levels is maintained through both union and works council 
structures in the initial decision making process. The extent of decentralisation within 
this framework is thus substantially limited, a further example being with the TS2000 
rationalisations. Although in this case an unusual form of Tarifvertrag (contract with 
the unions) was made, local Personalräte decision making was effectively restricted 
to negotiations on the details of the social plan to determine which workers would 
relocate.15 Yet the ability of the union and Hauptpersonalrat to conclude such 
centralised agreements is founded on the centralised nature of the Personalräte 
structure itself. That is, the Hauptpersonalrat has competence for decisions that it 
elects not to delegate.  
The hierarchical public sector works council structure contains a further 
institutional security—that being, the ability to escalate disagreements through each 
level of works council, before potentially being submitted to an arbitration committee 
(Einigungsstelle). Such a process typically averages 6 months for a single local 
office, and potentially could occur throughout the company. Thus, not only does this 
provide an essential method of co-ordination for the union and works council, but the 
possibility prompts Telekom to co-ordinate their own management decisions and 
policies centrally. 
Nevertheless, two points are of considerable importance. First, this structure has 
not fundamentally caused a centralisation of decision making in Telekom. Rather, the 
centralisation of decision making is already present, there being (to date) very little 
delegation of operational authority to the mid-level Direktion or especially local 
office (Neiderlassungen) levels, and indeed, there being a considerable absence of 
management tools to facilitate any such delegation.16 Related to this, the hierarchical 
Personalräte structure has meant that Telekom cannot conduct strategic (or tactical) 
decision making at one remove from worker representatives. 
5.2 Privatising the Works Council Structure 
                                                          
15  The contract securing employee protection against the TS2000 rationalisation measures was 
unique for a number of reasons. First, it is the first case in Germany of a contract 
guaranteeing employment security as the result of a rationalisation measure eliminating 
11,000 jobs. Second, the “Projekttarifvertrag” applies to only part of the workforce (i.e. those 
affected by TS2000), and only for a limited time period, until end 1996, coinciding with the 
rationalisation and reorganisation programme (Darbishire, 1995). 
16  A principal feature of the Telekom Kontakt reorganisation is, however, just such a 
decentralisation of management competence. Even the pilot regions in this project, however, 
report an absence of management systems to enable them to realise these goals yet. 
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The transfer to the private sector Betriebsrat structure of works councils 
involves a considerable change in roles and responsibilities for employee 
representatives, and will demand both a new union/works council strategy, and also a 
new union structure. Furthermore, this change resulting from privatisation is 
occurring alongside, and compounding, Telekom’s own organisational 
decentralisation inherent in its Telekom Kontakt project. The new role that is implied 
for the union, essentially one of co-ordination, illustrates the difficulties inherent in 
decentralisation even in Germany (Katz, 1993). 
The DPG successfully negotiated with Telekom that the three tier works council 
structure would be retained at least until 30 June 1997 (in order not to lose the 
experience of existing works councillors), to be followed by negotiations over the 
future structure (with the DPG goal of maintaining all three tiers, though doubtful 
that they will achieve this). This structure will be important in helping retain co-
ordination, though it will not amount to a hierarchical system. Furthermore, the 
change which is as important as the three tier structure is the decentralised 
competence inherent in the Betriebsrat system.  
The Gesamtbetriebsrat (central works council), with a membership of 26, has 
rights essentially for company wide decisions, or where the individual Betriebsräte 
delegate their authority to it. Decision making is not hierarchical, and conflicts cannot 
be escalated to the Gesamtbetriebsrat as in the public sector. Thus, in cases involving 
codetermination rights, decisions that are not company-wide must be settled (through 
the Einigungsstelle arbitration committee if necessary) at the local office level. 
Telekom view this as speeding up decision making at this level, making it a feasible 
option. However, even if Telekom does significantly decentralise managerial decision 
making, they also face the potential for considerable loss of synergy if negotiations 
and policy making occur in local offices. Alternatively, the retention of decision 
making competence at a remove from the local offices implies that the works councils 
will be exercising their rights of codetermination, information, and consultation with 
managers who are not the principal decision makers. This risk is greatest for strategic 
decisions, and other operational decisions with broad impact. 
There are a number of strategic responses required by the DPG to address these 
difficulties. First, it has sought to negotiate with Telekom over the appropriate works 
council structures. The agreement to have a transitionary middle tier (replacing the 
Bezirkspersonalräte) eases the co-ordination problem between the Gesamtbetriebsrat, 
and the local works councils. With a limited membership of the Gesamtbetriebsrat 
(fixed at an operationally practical 26), not all of the over 150 individual works 
councils can be represented at this level. Co-ordinating decisions, policies, and even 
information, requires an effective second tier, even if it lacks decision making 
authority, hence the importance of this agreement with Telekom.17 The DPG is 
pessimistic of its ability to extend this structure beyond 1997. In turn, the loss of a 
                                                          
17  Previously, the principal function of the Bezirkspersonalräte was one of co-ordination, while 
also possessing decision making rights. 
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second tier will entail the need to establish an alternative union based co-ordinating 
structure, requiring a change in the union organisational structure. The DPG does, 
indeed, have two advantages in addressing this co-ordination problem: First, its 
membership is restricted to the Deutsche Bundespost, giving it the ability to focus 
more closely on (and adjust to) “its” firms than many other unions. Thus, while a 
centralised union, the DPG structure already has the basis of such an organisation—
with Betriebsgruppenvorstand at the Betriebsrat level (or a 
Betriebsverwaltungsvorstand in its absence), a Bezirksvorstand corresponding to the 
previous middle tier works council, and a Hauptvorstand at the Gesamtbetriebsrat 
level. Second is the institutionalisation of the position of the union’s stewards 
(Vertrauensleute), irrespective of their membership of works councils. A contract 
negotiated while within the public sector, this enables the Vertauensleute to hold 
meetings, elections, and other activities using company facilities. 
The importance of the Vertrauensleute will expand with privatisation owing 
precisely to the demise of the 3 tier works council structure. Already an important 
and powerful grouping within Telekom (and the whole DBP) owing to the strength of 
the DPG, the Vertrauensleute have the capability of forming the foundation of a co-
ordinating structure not only between works councils, but also between establishment 
works councils and the Gesamtbetriebsrat. A central role will also be to ensure that 
the composition of the Gesamtbetriebsrat reflects the DPG policy stance. This is a 
central task of strong unions in all multi-establishment companies, and the 
achievement of this role can determine the importance and effectiveness of a 
Gesamtbetriebsrat. While in some large manufacturing plants, such as Ford and VW, 
the works council from the dominant plant can fulfil both the leadership and co-
ordination role, the geographically diverse organisation of Telekom, and the lack of 
any clear “leading” works council, will increase the emphasis on the union to fulfil 
this role, and produce its own “middle tier.” This emphasises the importance of a 
strong union within the works council structure. It also illustrates that the greater the 
diversity within the firm, the more important such a structure is. 
Thus, firms (and particularly manufacturing firms) with a restricted number of 
plants, and/or with a dominant plant that can itself lead and co-ordinate policies at 
both the establishment and company level, may need to rely less on such an 
additional union structure. (Cases in the automobile industry, however, indicate that 
these firms are also frequently those with such internal union strength—Streeck, 
1984a; Thelen, 1991; Turner, 1991.) Yet large service industry firms, in particular 
those lacking both large and dominant plants, require just such an internal union 
structure to complement the works council organisation, and to create synergy 
between the two. 
Such an internal union role plays an important part in complementing the 
external union role. Thus, this argument is complementary to Thelen’s (1988, 1991) 
view that the union and works council relationship is not a zero-sum one.  Thelen 
argues that the pressures towards a decentralisation of bargaining, work 
reorganisation, skill demand changes, and employer fragmentation strategies, 
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increase the importance of workplace bargaining, thus threatening the traditional base 
of central union power. Nevertheless, Thelen contends that works councils do not 
necessarily get pulled apart from the union, and that “plant egoism” and enterprise 
bargaining do not necessarily follow (Streeck, 1984b). This is precisely because the 
dual structure in Germany allows strategies to be adjusted within these institutions, to 
retain overall union strength. Thelen furthermore contends that the shift from 
quantitative to qualitative bargaining, and technological change, requires such a shift, 
but that the ability of the union to play a central co-ordinating and agenda setting role 
depends on its organisational and political resources at plant level. 
The argument advanced here is fundamentally consistent with this view, though 
it emphasises an additional element that is necessary to prevent either potential 
whipsawing/precedent-setting by the employer, or simply a fragmentation of worker 
representation and thus the undermining of their collective strength. The additional 
factor is inter works council co-ordination. Where decentralisation of bargaining is 
significant, such intra company co-ordination is needed as a supplement to inter 
company co-ordination. It is the decentralised nature of the private sector works 
council structure (in contrast to that in the public sector) that increases the imperative 
on the union supplementing such co-ordination. Nevertheless, the ability of the union 
to fulfil this co-ordinating task required by decentralisation is compounded by the 
divisionalisation inherent in Telekom’s customer orientated strategy, and Telekom 
Kontakt reorganisation. 
5.3 Further Fragmentation: Divisionalisation 
Telekom Kontakt, which began restructuring pilot local offices (Niederlassun-
gen) in April 1994, aims most fundamentally at a divisionalisation and 
decentralisation of the company. The principal divisions are for Networks, Business 
Customers, and Private Customers, while a Systems Customers division (for 300 key 
accounts) was also established at the beginning of 1994, though as the DeTeSystem 
subsidiary. The introduction of a line organisation, decentralisation, market 
orientation, and customisation of service are central to this strategy. That is, 
Telekom’s strategy emphasises the desire to align the service offered, and thus work 
organisation, by division.18 
To achieve this goal, Telekom is thus divisionalising its management structure, 
and has demanded a corresponding divisionalisation of the works council structure. 
That is, employees are to be represented by separate works councils according to their 
division, though with a single Gesamtbetriebsrat.19  The DPG is particularly 
                                                          
18  This organisation bears a very strong resemblance to the Project Sovereign organisation in BT 
(Darbishire, 1993). This is not coincidental, and reflects both similar underlying strategies 
and conceptions of the market, but also the role of international management consultants, who 
have been rife in both companies. 
19  The exception is with the subsidiaries, who are not party to the Gesamtbetriebsrat, though 
they have representation in the Konzernbetriebsrat. 
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concerned with the fragmentation this would cause, since workers in the same 
location would be represented by different works councils. (Indeed, the extent of 
fragmentation could, in theory, become dramatic if every establishment opted to have 
its own works councils, which would nevertheless also be divisionally based.) 
Furthermore, Telekom Kontakt implies a tripling of the size of local offices, though 
with responsibility for only one operational function. This would result in the 
“responsible” manager for any given works council being at a greater geographical 
remove, increasing the difficulty for the works council of effectively exercising its 
rights. 
Given the decentralised nature of the Betriebsräte system, divisionalising the 
works council structure threatens to produce differing conditions by division. The 
inability to hierarchically co-ordinate the whole system, as in the public sector, will 
greatly increase the likelihood of this, adding a greater imperative for the union that it 
structure strong and effective inter works council co-ordination. For Telekom, on the 
other hand, the goal is to allow both decentralised management (with the flexibility of 
personnel management that is implied by this), and to produce divisionalised working 
conditions, as appropriate to customer service requirements. As in AT&T and BT 
where the unions have also faced this dilemma, the union’s objective is to retain 
equality of conditions and collective strength. That is, their strategy is to avoid 
excessive divisional variation. 
Evidence from BT suggests that strategic managerial decision making has not 
been decentralised to the local office level, though it has varied by division. Indeed, 
the divisions differ in the respect to which decentralisation is deemed a viable option, 
depending on the importance of network integration, and the complexity of the 
technology. That is, decentralisation is minimal in the networks division, low in the 
business customer division, though somewhat greater in the residential customer 
division. In Telekom this would imply that works councillors will be at the furthest 
remove from the strategists in Networks and Business divisions.20 To avoid simply 
bargaining over the consequence of decisions, and to bargain over the strategy 
(Kochan, Katz, and McKersie, 1986), the DPG will need to create a greater 
centralisation than “naturally” occurs in the works council structure. Furthermore, it 
is the union that needs to ensure this centralisation since divisional decisions are 
formally not appropriate to the Gesamtbetriebsrat.  
The DPG has three further strategies to ensure consistency of conditions 
throughout Telekom. First, they are bargaining over the organisational structure 
implied in Telekom Kontakt. That is, they are using their institutional strength, and 
the ability to bargain over the consequences of organisational change, 
rationalisations, and new technology, to bargain for “unified” local offices. Rather 
than divisionalising local management (and thus the works council), Telekom would 
                                                          
20  This assumes that Telekom will orientate its strategic decision making around divisions. 
Internal strategic thought, however, is contemplating the development of strategies by its 22 
business units. This would provide an additional complication for the DPG. 
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then operate a “patch working” organisation. Although Telekom management are 
opposed to this, they were forced to agree to pilot trials of both organisational 
structures within Telekom Kontakt, with criteria by which each is to be judged. 
Ironically, having followed BT to the divisional structure, BT is now in the process of 
itself moving to a patch work organisation not dissimilar to that favoured by the 
DPG. Second, and related, the DPG is bargaining over how the works councils would 
be organised even should the divisional structure prevail. 
The third strategy of the DPG is to prevent a decentralisation of competence to 
the works councils, with the inherent co-ordinating complexity that would entail, by 
retaining decision making competence within the union. The DPG is, indeed, perhaps 
the most centralised of German unions anyway. Since it is not faced with substantial 
numbers of differentiated companies facing different economic conditions, it has 
been able to focus on the needs of the DBP. Strategically it preferred contracts to 
works council/company agreements, even within the public sector (and company 
level agreements have been uncommon within Telekom, the only three important 
recent examples being DELKOS, DASPO, and Working Time). This was based on 
the greater legal strength of contracts, the centralisation of the company, and the 
ability to use its industrial strength to reach agreements. Indeed, it is for precisely 
these reasons that Telekom is seeking to increase the use of company level 
agreements (Betriebsvereinbarungen). The DPG strategy to avoid a divisionalisation 
of working conditions, to ensure interaction with strategic decision makers, and to 
retain co-ordination between local works councils, is thus to retain strong, centralised 
bargaining, though allowing some delegation to local works councils where 
operationally necessary. 
6.  Conclusion 
The post-privatisation DPG strategy is premised on the objective of retaining co-
ordination between works councils throughout the company, with the inherent 
centralisation this implies, while also retaining similarity of conditions across the 
DBP (again achieved through the centralisation of contractual negotiations). 
Telekom, on the other hand, recognises the dilemma facing the union, but is anxious 
to promote local (and divisional) flexibility. This is producing an on-going 
negotiation (both formal and informal) to establish how the institutions of industrial 
relations will operate in the privatised Telekom. Increased competition, the demise of 
the infrastructural orientation at the expense of a customer focused strategy, rapid 
technological change, and rationalisations being brought about by digitalisation serve 
to complicate this “negotiating” process while simultaneously emphasising the 
flexibility and adjustment needs of Telekom. 
In this process, the DPG is conscious of avoiding the strategic error of the NCU 
in Britain—who in the immediate post-privatisation years focused on the goal of re-
nationalisation, rather than developing alternative strategies by which BT could 
compete. It is with this goal in mind that the DPG, one of the more left wing German 
unions, are actively developing possible organisation strategies (which are consistent 
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with where other advanced telecoms companies are moving), additional employment 
opportunities, and market strategies that emphasise high skilled, quality competition.  
These strategies are designed to reinforce the DPG’s institutional position, 
which has been severely challenged by the privatisation process. The organisational 
requirements on the union within Telekom have been increased, their inherent ability 
to co-ordinate change and strategies in works councils reduced, and the reduction of 
political contingency implies more rapid change in technology and work 
organisation. These challenges highlight a hitherto under-emphasised feature of the 
private sector works council structure—namely its decentralised nature, not in 
relation to unions, but in terms of its very internal organisation within the firm. This 
is in direct contrast to the public sector structure, and stresses the importance of inter 
works council co-ordination—a role most feasibly facilitated by union stewards 
(Vertrauensleute). 
The DPG does, however, have advantages over unions in other countries and 
companies in Germany in achieving its objectives. It is exceptionally strongly 
institutionalised within Telekom (legally, with respect membership levels of 
approximately 80%, in its existing organisational structures, and also in long-standing 
informal connections with pivotal decision makers), it has the ability to focus on just 
two important organisational units (Telekom and Post), and the pace of change within 
Telekom requires that Telekom maintain a positive relationship, given the union’s 
and works councils’ rights. Yet even in this context, the role the institutions (such as 
the Gesamtbetriebsrat and local works councils) will play will evolve out of both the 
on-going bargaining and the success of the union in structuring co-ordinating 
mechanisms between works councils.  
The resulting structure is not predetermined by the legally mandated institutions. 
The change from the public to private sector does, however, clearly highlight the 
challenges faced. In doing so, it does more than illustrate the role that public sector 
status played within Telekom. Rather, it also shows the dilemma faced by many other 
firms in the private sector. That is, it illustrates that decentralisation and 
divisionalisation do not simply imply a shift of competence between the union and 
works council. Rather, the decentralised works council structure is shown to be 
complex in large firms. This requires not only effective co-ordination to maintain a 
consistent standard of working conditions, but also to ensure interaction with 
strategic decision makers. This task is eased insofar as decision making actually 
occurs at the plant level—as in many large manufacturing operations (including many 
automobile plants). In large service industry firms, however, the locational diversity 
of operations significantly complicates the imperative on the union to co-ordinate 
inter works council actions, while simultaneously managing the decentralisation from 
the union to works council level, and interacting with strategic decision makers.  
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